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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

i

Case No. 860220

]
i

JERRY J. DIBELLO,

Priority No, 2

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jerry J. Dibello, was charged with second
degree murder and convicted by a jury in December 1985 in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, State of
Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding.

Defendant was

subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to
life in the Utah State Prison.
On or about July 23, 1987, Defendant moved this Court
to supplement the record as to whether or not an objection was
made by the Defendant to the introduction of a video tape marked
and received as State's Exhibit 67 and for clarification as to
the basis of said objection if one were made.

Defendant sought

by motion with this Court further clarification as to how much of
the video tape was played to the jury during the State's case in
chief and whether the jury had access to the entire tape during
1

its deliberation.

Defendant also sought in that same motion

permission to supplementally brief and argue the issues raised by
the augmentation of record in this Court.
This Court, based upon parties1 stipulation, remanded
the case back to the trial court for the purpose of augmenting
the record as set forth above.

This order was signed on August

10, 1987.
Hearings have been held in the District Court, the
Honorable Judge Rokich presiding, evidence has been received, and
the case is back before this Court for further argument and
decision.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State, during its investigation of this homicide,
had prepared a video tape of the crime scene.

Tr. Vol. 4, 692-

696.l
The State also introduced still photos of the crime
scene, including still photos of the body of the victim and the
interior and exterior of the trailer which were introduced at

1 "TIT ." refers to transcript of trial by volume and page
number; "R." refers to record on appeal; "Aug." refers to transcript of proceedings occurring during jury deliberations on
December 12, 1987, by page number; "Supp." refers to transcript
of evidentiary hearing occurring on October 20, 1987, by page number.
2

Defendant's t r i a l

without o b j e c t i o n . 2

The medical

t e s t i f i e d without challenge as to the cause of death.

examiner
Tr. Vol.

I I , 301-310 (multiple stab wounds.)
Approximately seven minutes and t h i r t y
Plaintiff's

Exhibit 67, the video tape of the crime scene, was

played to the jury during the S t a t e ' s case in chief.
At the time the S t a t e offered
following

seconds of

Plaintiff's

Supp. 13. 3

Exhibit

67,

the

exchange occurred between the Court and counsel

for

Defendant:
THE COURT: Mr. E l t o n , before we p r o c e e d , we
probably ought to have the admittance of that t a p e .
MR. ELTON: That would probably be appropriate,
your Honor. We ask that that tape i t s e l f be removed
from the video tape machine at t h i s time unless you
want to see i t again.
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, with Mr. E l t o n ' s permission, when we recess I would l i k e to look at t h i s tape
again, the r e s t of that tape again.
2 P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 4 consisted of a s t i l l photo of the
t r a i l e r door which was admitted i n t o e v i d e n c e .
Tr. p . 5 1 .
P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t 6 was a s t i l l photo of the body of the
victim. Tr. p . 53 P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 9 was a s t i l l photo of the
body of the victim which was introduced at Tr. 292.
Plaintiff's
Exhibit 10 consisted of s t i l l photos of s t a b wounds i n f l i c t e d
upon the victim. Tr. p . 305. P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 27 was a s t i l l
photo of the t r a i l e r door. Tr. p . 339. P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 31
was a s t i l l photo of a f i n g e r p r i n t . Tr. p . 341.
3 At t h e s u p p l e m e n t a l h e a r i n g , i t was s t i p u l a t e d as
reflected in the record that the portion that was shown to the
jury began one minute, 1.6 seconds into the tape and the tape was
then turned off at eight minutes, 36.4 seconds into the t a p e .
3

THE COURT: Finef you may do so. But as to the
portion of the tape that has been exhibited before the
Court —
MR. KELLER: I previously stated my objection in
chambers to that. I believe the Court overruled that
objection.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. ELTON: We ask that the video tape be marked
as Exhibit No. 67. We have marked that and introduced
it as evidence at this time.
THE COURT: Exhibit 67 , the portion of that tape
that has been shown here before the jury is admitted
into evidence. (Tr. Vol. 4, 696). (Emphasis added.)
Trial counsel for Defendant at remand hearing filed an
affidavit with the Court wherein he indicated that at the trial
of the action a discussion occurred in chambers between counsel
for the Defendantf the Court, and the prosecuting

attorney

regarding a certain video tape of the crime scene which was
subsequently marked and received as State's Exhibit 67.

During

this discussion in chambers, counsel for Defendant objected to
the receipt of said exhibit on the grounds and for the reasons
that the prejudicial impact outweighed the probative value of the
information conveyed in State's Exhibit 67.

He further stated

under oath that at the time he lodged that objection in chambers,
the Court overruled that objection and the tape was ultimately
received into evidence.

R.

.

At the time of the hearing on remand, trial counsel for
4

the Defendant was asked the following question regarding the
conversation in chambers:
Q. Now what was the nature of your objection that
you stated to the Court? Did that go to both the
redacted as well as the non-redacted portion of the
tape?
A. Yes, it did. My objection went to playing any
portion of that tape whatsoever on the grounds again
that any probative value it may have would be outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the jury. The
body of the deceased had been laying in a specific
position for some period of time. It was clear that
rigor mortis had set in. There was a certain bloating
of the body. The tape showed very gruesome wounds to
the throat area....
I believe again whatever probative value that that
might have provided was outweighed by the prejudicial
effect. And as I say, the judge overruled the objection. (Supp. p. 6).
During the jury's deliberations, at 9:30 p.m. the jury
made a request to view the video tape again and it was played to
the jury.

Aug. p. 2.
After viewing the video tape the second time, the jury

returned its verdict of guilty and defendant appealed.
ARGUMENT
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE VIDEO TAPE OF
THE CRIME SCENE BECAUSE ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS
OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL IMPACT UPON THE
JURY.
Rule

403 o f

r e l e v a n t p a r t s as

the

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence

provides

follows:

A l t h o u g h r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may be e x c l u d e d
5

if

its

in

probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ... or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court

in 1968 in ruling on the

predecessor to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence held in
State v. Poef 441 P.2d 512 (1968) as follows:
All the material facts which could conceivably
been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been
established by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony. The only purpose served was to inflame and
arouse the jury.
Factually, in the Poe case, black and white photos had
been introduced showing the crime scene including the victim's
body with bullet holes in his head.

Colored slides were also

made during the course of the autopsy which were the subject of
the Court's ruling.

The Court said regarding these pictures,

"They would have been gruesome in black and whitef but the color
accentuates their gruesomeness."

Interestingly enough, the Court

reached this conclusion and reversed a capital conviction in the
absence of an objection from the defendant during the trial, the
Court noting that "This Court will not allow such a technicality
to influence its decision in a case such as this."
Even though the Poe decision supports the defendant's
position in connection with the receipt of the video tape, it is
largely devoid of analysis and in many respects is not very

6

helpful to the Court's determination of this particular issue.4
The first Utah Supreme Court decision which contains
analysis helpful to a decision in this case is the case of State
v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63f 64 (1983), wherein the Court in
analyzing the introduction of gruesome photographs set forth the
following analysis:
Our present law makes clear that the trial court
must be concerned with something more than relevance in
ruling on the admission of such photographs.... In all
such cases, the court should determine whether the
viewing of the photographs by the jury would create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice against the
defendant, and if so, whether that danger substantially
outweighs the photograph's essential evidentiary value.
The more inflammatory the photograph, the greater the
need to establish its essential evidentiary value.
(Citation omitted.) And conversely, the more essential
the evidentiary value of the photograph, the greater
the defendant's burden to require its exclusion on the
basis that its inflammatory nature would be prejudicial
to him. The point of reference to "essential evidentiary value" in the context of potentially prejudicial
photographs of the victim's body is that such photographs would generally be inappropriate where the only
relevant evidence they convey can be put before the
jury readily and accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential prejudice.
The case at bar provides a perfect example of abuse of
discretion in allowing the introduction of the video tape.

All

information that could have been conveyed to the jury which was
relevant to the State's burden of proof had and was conveyed to
4

See also State v. Johnson , 475 P.2d 543 (1970) for
another case largely devoid oT any analysis and supporting the
introduction of gruesome photographs.
7

the jury by other non-objectionable means. The cause, manner and
time of death had been established.
victim had died

No one disputed that the

from multiple stab wounds.

Everything of

evidentiary value had been examined by the State Crime Lab
including possible fingerprints, fiber analysis, blood testing,
etc.

Evidence regarding conclusions drawn from this evidence was

presented to the jury.

A viewing of the video tape by the jury

was essentially devoid of any "essential evidentiary value."

Its

only purpose could have been to arouse and inflame the jury,
which is precisely why we have in the Rules of Evidence a
possible 403 objection.
The Garcia analysis was developed even further in State
v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (1986) where this Court reversed a
second degree homicide conviction based upon a misapprehension of
the Rule 403 analysis.

There the Court held as follows:

Clearly, it is not enough that a potentially
prejudicial photograph convey relevant information; it
must convey relevant information that cannot readily be
provided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial
means. See State v. Wells, Utah 603 P.2d 810, 813
(1979). Moreover, even if the photograph is the best
available means of conveying the relevant information,
the essential evidentiary value of that information
must still be balanced against the potential for unfair
prejudice.
The Court then went on to note the following:
Under Garcia, potentially prejudicial photographs
are "generally inappropriate" and should not be
admitted in evidence unless they have some essential
8

evidentiary value that outweighs their unfairly
prejudicial impact. 663 P.2d at 64. Only after a
determination has been made that thee photographs have
such value need the weighing be made. The trial court
misapprehended the law and for that reason admitted the
photographs without first properly evaluating the
evidence.
As established and set forth in Garcia and expanded
upon in Cloud, the following analysis should occur when the court
is faced with the receipt of gruesome photographs or in this case
video tape evidence.

The trial court should begin with the

proposition that potentially prejudicial photographs are generally inappropriate unless those photographs contain information
which has "essential evidentiary value."

After it is determined

that the information contained does have "essential evidentiary
value," then that "essential evidentiary value" must be weighed
against the prejudicial impact that the information will have
upon the trier of fact.

Because the trial court in Cloud

misapprehended the law and used a general relevance standard
instead of a balancing standard as established in Garcia, the
court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs.
In the case at bar, it is difficult to conceive of what
information conveyed by the video tape is of "essential evidentiary value."

Under Cloud and Garcia the weighing or balancing

that occurs after that determination has been made should never
have occurred because the video tape is devoid of "essential
9

evidentiary value."

All of the information conveyed by the video

tape had been presented to the jury in non-objectionable form.
Even if the trial court had performed the analysis as set forth
in Cloud , it is difficult to see how the "essential evidentiary
value" of the information conveyed in the video tape outweighed
the potential prejudice associated with that same information.
As will be abundantly clear when the Court views the video tape
at the time of the argument in connection with this case, the
scene depicted is an extremely gruesome scene.

As reflected by

defendant's lawyer at trial, the body had been laying in the same
position for a length of time, rigor mortis had begun to set in,
the body was in a bloated condition and because of this bloating
there was a gaping of the wound to the neck, the chest and torso
of the victim were covered with blood, and then the video tape
goes beyond the actual crime scene into the victim's bedroom
where a picture of the defendant and the victim as husband and
wife is conveyed with a caption, all of which is and was extremely prejudicial.

When this information is weighed against the

possible prejudicial

impact of the video tape, there is no

appropriate way that the evidence should have been admitted.
As reflected in Garcia, "The more inflammatory the
photograph, the greater the need to establish its essential
evidentiary value and conversely, the more essential the eviden10

tiary value of the photograph, the greater the defendant's burden
to require its exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory
nature would be prejudicial to him."

Garcia at p. 64.

In the

case at bar, the video tape is extremely inflammatory and that is
not weighed

against a possible claim that the information

conveyed has strong "essential evidentiary value," but it is
weighed against very limited, if any, "essential evidentiary
value."

Under the circumstances, the evidence should not have

been presented to the trier of fact.
Not only did the jury view this evidence during the
State's case in chief, but the jury additionally viewed the video
tape during its deliberation as reflected by the record.
CONCLUSION
Because the

trial

court

erred

in

admitting

over

defendant's objection the video tape of the crime scene, defendant r e s p e c t f u l l y

seeks a r e v e r s a l of his conviction

and a new

trial.
Respectfully

submitted t h i s

day of November,

1987.

KENNETH R. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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